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Bank Examination Classifications and 
Loan Risk 
By Kenneth Spong and  Thomas Hoenig 
The  commercial. bank  examination  process 
strives to protect depositors and ensure that a 
bank  properly serves its community.  A  major 
part of  the examination  process is  the evalua- 
tion  of  a  bank's  loan  portfolio  in  order  to 
identify  any loans that show  undue  risk  and 
may  be  uncollectible.  Such  loans,  which  are 
referred to as classified loans, may be useful in 
evaluating the risk exposure of  bank loan port- 
folios. Banks having a relatively low  volume of 
classified loans, for example, might be low-risk 
banks. This would  be true, however, only if  a 
reliable  relationship  exists  between  loans 
classified by examiners and actual loan losses. 
While  such  a  relationship  might  exist,  few 
formal studies  have  been  made  to determine 
the  usefulness  of  examination  data  in 
evaluating  the  risk  exposure  of  bank  loan 
portfolios. ' 
This  article  analyzes  information  compiled 
from examination reports of  a sample of  state 
member  banks  in  the  Tenth  Federal  Reserve 
District.  The  purpose  of  the  analysis  is  to 
explore, for the sample banks, various aspects 
Kenneth Spong is an economist and Thomas Hoenig is an 
assistant  vice  president,  both  in  the  Division  of  Bank 
Supervision and Structure at the Federal Reserve Bank  of 
Kansas City. 
of the  relationship  between loans classified  by 
examiners  and  actual  loan  losses  and  to 
determine whether data from the sample banks 
provide  any  evidence  that  examination 
information may be used to indicate the riski- 
ness of loan portfolios. 
THE EXAMINATION PROCESS 
The primary objective of  the loan examina- 
tion  is  to evaluate the  overall  condition  of  a 
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typical  bank's  assets  are loans,  this  review  is 
one of the more important segments of  a bank 
examination. In a ,loan  review,  examiners first 
determine a dollar cutoff level for a bank  and 
then  proceed  to examine only  those  lines  of 
credit above this level. Loans  below the cutoff 
level are usually not reviewed  because of  their 
large number and their relatively small contri- 
bution to the total dollar amount of  the bank's 
loan portfolio. 
The  examiners  next  begin  to  collect 
information that they  will  need  to judge  the 
soundness of  those loans  selected  for  review. 
First,  examiners  record  on  "line  cards" the 
relevant details of  each particular loan, such as 
borrower's  name,  business,  original  and 
present  loan  balance,  repayment  terms  and 
interest rate,  collateral,  payment history,  and 
other  supporting  documentation.  With  this 
information, the examiner also ties major credit 
lines together by  borrower, since the examiner 
is concerned with evaluating all of  a borrower's 
loans.  The  bank's  credit  files  are  then 
employed  to  analyze  the  credits  and  to 
complete the loan documentation. These credit 
files  will  normally  contain  financial  and 
operating statements and cash flow projections, 
as well  as other  important  financial  informa- 
tion.  Also, the credit lines are discussed with 
the  bank's  management  to  check  on  any 
missing information and  recent  developments 
as well  as  to  gain  insights  into  management 
loan policies. 
Once the examiner collects the needed  infor- 
mation,  he  begins  to  formally  evaluate  each 
loan.  Loans  which  demonstrate  weakness  or 
2 For most of the banks in the sample, this cutoff level was 
set at approximately 1 per cent of a  bank's gross capital. 
This ensured that  the  most  important loans  in  a  bank's 
portfolio  were  examined  and  that  approximately  70  per 
cent  of  the  dollar  volume  of  each  bank's  loans  were 
reviewed. 
undue risk are then criticized or  classified  by 
the examiners. According to  the standardized 
loan  classification  procedures  drafted  by  the 
three Federal supervisory agencies in 1949, the 
three main loan classification categories are: 
1)  Substandard-for those  lines of 
credit  "involving  more  than  a 
normal risk due to the financial 
condition or  unfavorable record 
of  the obligator,  insufficiency of 
security, or other factors noted in 
the examiner's comments." 
2)  Doubtful--credits "the  ultimate 
collection  of  which  is  doubtful 
and  in  which  a  substantial  loss 
is probable but not yet  definitely 
ascertainable in amount." 
3)  Loss-credits which are regarded 
as uncollectible and as estimated 
losses which should be written off 
against the bank's capital. 
In choosing whether to classify  a  loan into 
one of these categories, the examiner will  rely 
on the loan documentation, collateral, and his 
analysis  of  the  financial  statement.  The 
examiner  will  also  look  at  the  repayment 
history of  the loan and the present and future 
prospects  of  the  borrower.  For  example,  an 
examiner would generally classify a loan if past 
payments have not been made, the collateral is 
insufficient, or the borrower is demonstrating a 
poor  earnings  record.  Also,  a  loan  might  be 
criticized  if  the  bank's  credit  files  did  not 
contain sufficient  current  information  on  the 
borrower and  if  the  bank's  management  was 
not  closely  supervising  the  loan.  But  more 
importantly,  the  examiner  must  use  a  great 
deal of  judgement and discretion in evaluating 
loans, especially since he has no direct contact 
with  the  borrower.  The  basis  for  such 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City judgement rests on the examiner's training and 
experience  and  on  certain  credit  guidelines 
similar to those  used  by  bankers  in  granting 
loans. 
The  actual  choice  of  which  classification 
category  is  appropriate  for  a  weak  loan  will 
further depend  on  the examiner's  view  of  its 
ultimate collectibility. For example, "doubtful" 
and "loss" classifications  are  judged  as 
probable losses and uncollectible loans, respec- 
tively. Thus, these loans should be much more 
likely chargeoff candidates than "substandard" 
loans, which  represent the ex ante judgements 
of examiners, since any weaknesses these loans 
show  are  not  yet  sufficient  to  immediately 
threaten their collectibility. The examiner may 
also choose  to classify  only  a  portion  of  any 
loan or to separate a loan and classify portions 
of it in different categories. This might be likely 
if only part of  a loan was adequately collateral- 
ized or if the borrower's  income was  sufficient 
to retire only part of  the debt. 
After  this  examination,  all  classified  loans 
judged  by  the examiners as uncollectible 
should  be  charged  off  against  the  bank's 
capital account.  In  addition,  the bank's 
management is then expected to review the re- 
maining classified loans and determine if there 
is any way to improve the quality of these loans. 
The  subsequent  performance  of  many 
classified  loans  may  be  followed  in  later 
examination  reports.  For  example,  if  a 
classified loan  has shown  no improvement, it 
would  usually  be  criticized  again  in  the  next 
examination.  Moreover,  if  such  a  loan  has 
shown any deterioration, it could be listed in a 
more severe category.  Thus,  a  classified  loan 
might  be  criticized  in  several  examinations 
until  either  it  had  to  be  charged  off  or  its 
condition  improved  enough  to  warrant  an 
unclassified status. Finally, some of these loans 
might be partly charged off  at one time,  with 
the  remainder  being  continued  as  an  active 
loan on the bank's books. 
THE LOAN CLASSIFICATION-LOSS 
RELATIONSHIP 
This section analyzes data from examination 
reports  from  a  sample  of  13 Tenth  District 
banks over a 14-year span from 1%2  through 
1975.  The  purpose  of  the  analysis  is  to 
investigate several aspects of  the classification- 
loss relationship. First, the analysis determines 
the  portion  of  all  loan  losses  that  were 
previously classified  by  bank  examiners.  The 
second aspect examined is  the loss experience 
of  classified  loans  and  the  extent to which 
examiners  were  successful  in  identifying  the 
relative  riskiness  of  such  loans.  Finally,  this 
section  compares  the  loss  experience  of 
classified loans with that of unclassified loans. 
The examination data are analyzed using the 
following  theoretical  framework.  First,  total 
loan losses from a bank's  portfolio are divided 
into two categories: losses from loans classified 
by  the  examiners  and  losses  from  loans  not 
classified. This can be written as follows: 
where 
B =total loan losses (in dollar terms), 
CB = losses from classified loans, and 
UB  = losses from unclassified loans. 
(Note: UB includes losses  from both loans above 
the cutoff level which the examiners did not clas- 
sify  and  loans below the cutoff level which were 
not reviewed by the examiner.) 
Next,  these  losses  can  be  expressed  in 
percentage terms and  related  to all  classified 
and unclassified loans as follows: 
where 
C = total amount of classified loans, and 
U =total amount of unclassified loans. 
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classified loans,  CB, can  be  divided  into the 
three classification categories: 
where 
S = substandard classifications, 
D = doubtful classifications, 
L = loss classifications, and 
Subscript B represents losses from each respective 
category. 
With this framework, examination data from 
the  13  state  member  banks  were  analyzed, 
including all classified loans.'  The data yielded 
over 1,000 loan classifications at these  banks. 
Also, a record was made of  all chargeoffs (that 
is, losses) and recoveries from  these  classified 
loans as well as all other significant chargeoffs 
included  in  the  reserve  for  bad  debts 
adjustment  page  of  the  state  and  Federal 
Reserve examination reports. Information from 
examiner loan chargeoff  cards and line  cards 
was used to supplement the above information 
and  to ensure  that  a  complete  data set  was 
assembled. Although the dates of classifications 
and  losses  were  also  recorded,  the  following 
analysis  focuses  primarily  on  the  size  and 
number of classifications and losses, and not on 
their  timing.  For  the sample  banks, the  vast 
majority of loan losses occurred within three or 
3 The 13  banks  were  selected from  the list  of  all  Tenth 
District  state  member  banks.  Stratified  sampling  was 
utilized to select a small  and a large  bank  group on the 
basis of total bank assets as of June 30, 1969.  Five banks, 
each having total assets of  $25 million or more as of  that 
date were in the large bank group, while eight banks were 
in  the small  bank group.  These 13  banks ranged  in  size 
from  approximately  $3  million  to  $250  million  in  total 
assets. The sample was  restricted  to 13 banks because of 
practical  resource  restrictions  and  the  desire  to  follow  a 
group  of  banks  and  all  of  their  classified  loans  over  a 
period encompassing a variety of economic conditions. 
four  years  after  the  initial  date  of 
classification. 
Loan Losses and Their Previous 
Classification 
Losses  can  arise  from  either  classified  or 
unclassified  loans.  If  losses  previously 
classified,  CB, constitute a  large  portion of  a 
bank's  total losses, B, bank examinations have 
been  successful  in  detecting  and  classifying 
most risky loans. If this CB/B fraction is small, 
however, the examination has failed to identify 
most loan problems. 
To determine the CB/B ratio for the sample 
banks,  all  chargeoffs  from  loans  above  the 
examiner cutoff  level were traced  back  to see 
whether  they  had  previously been  classified.' 
These  large  loan  losses  and  their  previous 
classification records were examined in terms of 
both the number of chargeoffs and their dollar 
amounts.  The loan loss  information  was  then 
used to divide all of the sample banks'  charge- 
offs  into three separate categories:  small  loan 
chargeoffs, large loan chargeoffs not previously 
classified, and large loan chargeoffs previously 
classified. The chargeoffs from classified loans 
were  further  divided  into  substandard, 
doubtful, and loss categories for the last exam- 
ination  prior  to  charge~ff.~  Since  the  results 
Both complete and partial loan chargeoffs are included in 
this section.  A few  of  the  partial chargeoffs  were  less in 
dollar  terms than  the examiner cutoff  level;  these  partial 
chargeoffs were  included  if  they could  be shown  to come 
from loans above the cutoff level. In the case of large loans 
not  previously  classified,  this  information  was  generally 
available from the examiner's  line and chargeoff cards or 
from the examination reports. 
A number of the loans charged off were previously listed 
under  more  than  one  classification  category  during  a 
particular  examination.  If  this  occurred,  each  chargeoff 
was  assumed to originate with  and continue through  the 
severest  classification  categories  listed.  Also,  if  a  loan 
chargeoff arose from more than one classification category, 
this  chargeoff  was  apportioned  among  the  respective 
categories. 
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Table 1 
LOAN CWAWQEOFFS AND THEIR SOURCES: 9962-95 
(In thousands of  dollars) 
All  Banks (12)  Large Banks (4)  '  Small Banks (8) 
Dollar  Per  Dollar  Per  Dollar  Per 
Amount  Cent  Amount  -  Cent  Amount  Cent  - 
Total chargeoffs (B)  6,420  100.0  4,253  100.0  2,167  100.0 
Previously classified  (CB)  *  3,932  61.2  2,586  60.8  1,346  62.1 
Substandard  1,355  21.1  887  20.9  468  21.6 
Doubtful  866  13.5  729  17.1  137  6.3 
Loss  1,712  26.7  970  22.8  74 2  34.2 
Previously unclassified 
(UB)  2,489  38.8  1,667  .  39.2  822  37.9 
Examined (large loans)  569  8.9  348  8.2  22 1  10.2 
Not  examined (below 
cutoff level)  1,920  29.9  -  1,319  31 .O  60 1  27.7  '. 
'Last  examination prior to chargeoff. 
from the number of  chargeoffs  and the dollar  - 
amount of chargeoffs are generally comparable, 
only dollar terms are discussed here. 
Of  total  loan  chargeoffs  for  the  sample 
banks, over 61 per cent  (i.e., the CB/B ratio) 
were from large loans which the examiners had 
previously classified (Table  Of the remain- 
der, nearly 30 per cent came from small loans 
below the cutoff level and fewer than 9 per cent 
One of  the larger  banks  had to be dropped  from  this 
section because of a change in reporting procedures, so the 
results reported are for the remaining 12 banks. A number 
of  the  smaller  loans  charged  off  had  been  previously 
reviewed and classified by  the examiners  because of  their 
past  due status or  because  they  were  the  remainder  of 
larger  classifications.  However,  such  loans  were  not 
reported separately in Table 1 because no specific chargeoff 
information was available on  many of  these classifications 
below the cutoff level. Also, these loans were generally not 
of sufficient number or size to warrant further  considera- 
tion. 
were from large loans which the examiners did 
not  classify.  In  addition,  of  total  loan 
chargeoffs,  21 per cent  had been  classified as 
substandard, and 13 and 27 per cent had been 
classified as doubtful and loss, respectively, in 
the  most  recent  examination  prior  to  their 
chargeoffs. Of the loss classification chargeoffs, 
over  one-half  had  been  originally  detected  at 
the  substandard  or  doubtful  level.  Indeed, 
nearly 40 per cent of  all chargeoffs  were first 
classified as substandard, and over 8 per cent 
of  total chargeoffs were  originally classified as 
doubtful.' 
Bank examiners thus appear to catch a large 
portion  of  the  problem  loans  in  the  pool  of 
7 These  results  were  based  on  our  review  of  loans  by 
number of  chargeoffs and by  initial classification category 
for classified loans. 
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million ($3,932 million  + $0.569  million)  of 
large loan chargeoffs in  Table 1, less than $0.6 
million ($0.569 million), or approximately one- 
eighth,  was  not  previously  classified  by  the 
examiners.  Since  loan  classifications  repre- 
sented, on average, only 1 to 3 per cent of total 
loans at the sample banks, the bank examiners 
have  used  a  relatively  small  pool  of  loans  to 
identify these problem loans. 
Loss Experience of  Classified Loans 
If  the examiners are successful in  grouping 
classified loans into separate categories, those 
classified  as  loss  should  have  the  highest 
chargeoff  rates,  followed  by  doubtful  loans, 
and substandard classifications should have the 
lowest loss record. 
In terms of the loan-loss model, the following 
relationship would  be expected: 
For  the  sample  banks,  this  classification-loss 
relationship was estimated by tracing each loan 
classification through from its initial listing in 
an examination report to its final settlement as 
loss,  paid-in-full,  or  removed  from  classifica- 
ti0n.O 
Since an individual loan may be classified for 
a number of  consecutive examinations, a pro- 
cedure  must  be  established  for  tracing  loans 
classified  more than once. Such a loan can  be 
counted as a classification either once, that is, 
8 Before  proceeding,  we  would  caution  that  we  are  not 
testing  here  for  examiner  efficiency  or  accuracy. 
Examiners,  in  carrying  out their  responsibilities,  are not 
directly trying to predict a bank's  losses, but rather trying 
to promote bank  soundness  by  identifying  possible loan 
problems  before  they  have  deteriorated  to  the  point  of 
default.  Thus, an examiner  would be judged successful if 
he alerted a bank's management  to potential  loan difficul- 
ties in time to reduce the risk of default. 
at the time it is  first noted, or each time it is 
encountered  in  an  examination  report  as  a 
classified  loan.  The  first  method  is  more 
appropriate for studying the loss possibilities of 
an examiner's  first perception of  a weak  loan. 
The  second  alternative,  however,  also  has 
important implications. For example,  if  one's 
concern  is  the  loss  implications  of  classified 
loans from a particular examination report, or 
if one's concern is the loss relationship of loans 
repeatedly classified, then this second approach 
is  more  u~eful.~  Because  of  this  difference, 
therefore, both approaches are followed  in  the 
study. 
When classified  loans were traced according 
to  their  original  criticism,  the  three 
classification  categories  of  substandard, 
doubtful,  and loss generally conformed  to the 
expected  relative  risk  pattern.  Substandard 
loans had  the lowest  chargeoff  rate,  and  loss 
classifications  were  the  most  likely  chargeoff 
candidates.  These  results  are  presented  in 
Table 2. 
Of the 631 classifications in Table 2, a total 
of  538,  or 85 per cent, were  first classified as 
substandard, with  the remainder roughly split 
between  doubtful  and  loss  classifications.  Of 
the  loans classified as  substandard,  about  19 
per cent were charged off, fewer than 9 per cent 
were still classified, and 72 per cent were  paid 
in  full  or  were  still  outstanding  without 
classification. For loans classified as doubtful, 
9 The  classified  loans  that  were  traced  in  this  section 
include all substandard, doubtful, and loss classifications 
above the cutoff level at the 13 sample banks. If a loan was 
classified  under  more  than  one  category,  the  separate 
amounts classified were listed under each of  the respective 
categories.  Any  chargeoffs  and  recoveries from  classified 
loans  were  recorded  according  to  whether  they  were 
complete or partial.  Also,  if  a loan  classified under  more 
than one category was only partly charged off, the charge- 
off  was  assumed to originate from  the  most  severe loan 
classification categories.  In  addition,  any  loan  still  clas- 
sified  in  the  1976  and  1977  examinations  without  any 
chargeoffs was listed under the separate category of "loans 
still classified." 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City 54 per cent were charged off. Of the loss classi-  while substandard classifications  have the 
fications, 93 per cent were charged off.  lowest percentage. Thus, loss classifications, in 
Table 2 also indicates that if  complete and  addition  to  being  the  most  likely  chargeoff 
partial chargeoffs are compared for each classi-  candidates,  are  also  the  most  likely  to  be 
fication  category,  the  loss  category  has  the  charged off in their entirety. 
highest  percentage  of  complete  chargeoffs,  When the second approach for tracing loans 
Table 2 
11088  EXPERIENCE OF CLASSUFUED LOANS:  8962-76 
Substandard  Total  Doubtful  Loss 
Per  Per  Per  Per 
---  Number  Cent  Number  Cent  Number  Cent  Number  Cent  -  - 
All Banks (13) 
Classified  631  100.0  538  100.0  50  100.0  43  100.0 
Charged off:  170  26.9  103  19.1  27  54.0  40  93.0 
Complete  88  13.9  39  7.2  13  26.0  36  83.7 
Partial  82  13.0  64  11.9  14  28.0  4  9.3 
Not charged off:  461  73.1  435  80.9  23  46.0  3  7  .O 
Paid-in-full or 
no longer 
classified  41  5  65.8  389  72.3  23  46.0  3  7.0 
Still classified  46  7.3  46  8.6  0  0  0  0 
Large Banks (5) 
Classified  269  100.0  234  100.0  17  100.0  18  100.0 
'. 
Charged off:  66  24.5  37  15.8  12  70.6  17  94.4 
Complete  33  12.3  10  4.3  7  41.2  16  88.9 
Partial  33  12.3  27  11.5  5  29.4  1  5.6 
Small Banks (81 
Classified  362  100.0  304  100.0  33  100.0  25  100.0 
Charged off:  104  28.7  66  21.7  15  45.5  23  92.0 
Complete  55  15.2  29  9.5  6  18.2  20  80.0 
Partial  49  13.5  3  7  12.2  9  27.3  3  12.0 
r 
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classified,  the  chargeoff  percentages  for 
classified  loans  in  the  three  categories  were 
slightly higher than  under the  fust approach. 
Thus, the higher chargeoff  percentages under 
this second method imply that loans classified 
more  than  once  have  higher  default  rates.1° 
Since  these  percentages  are  otherwise 
comparable with  the previous  results,  no 
separate  presentation  is  given.  In  summary, 
therefore, these results indicate that about  20 
per cent of-substandard  loans, 50  per cent of 
doubtful, and 95 per cent of  loss classifications 
will eventually be charged off. 
Loss Comparisons of Classified and 
Unclassified Loans 
If the examination process has been  able to 
separate sound loans from unsound ones, losses 
from  unclassified  loans  should  be  less  likely 
than losses from classified ones. That is, UB/U 
should  be less  than  CB/C.  In  fact, given  the 
definitions for each classified loan category, the 
following relationship should occur: 
To  test  this  relationship,  chargeoffs  from 
unclassified loans were first compared with  all 
unclassified  loans."  Also,  chargeoffs  from 
loans in the three classification categories were 
compared  with  total  classifications  in  each 
category. Since information was  available only 
on the dollar amount of  unclassified loans and 
their  chargeoffs, and  not  on  the  number  of 
10 As  a  verification  of  this,  substandard  loans  were 
separated  into two groups:  those classified one  year  only 
and those classified two years or more.  These loans  were 
then traced to check for eventual chargeoffs. Of the loans 
classified one year only,  approximately  14 per  cent  were 
charged off. For loans classified substandard for two years 
or more, the chargeoff rate was just over 30 per cent. 
such  loans,  both  unclassified  and  classified 
loans were traced by  their dollar amounts. This 
is in  contrast to the previous analysis in which 
the  chargeoff  percentages  are  based  on  the 
number of  loans rather than their dollar size. 
The dollar  chargeoff  figures,  however,  give  a 
more  direct  indication  of  the  actual  risk 
exposure in  a  bank's  loan  portfolio and  also 
reflect  the  fact  that  many  loan  losses,  both 
unclassified  and  classified,  are  only  partial 
chargeoffs. 
According to Table 3, the chargeoff  rate on 
unclassified  loans,  UB/U,  was  approximately 
0.14  per  cent.  The  small  bank  group  had  a 
higher rate of 0.19 per cent, while the rate of 
the large bank group was 0.12 per cent. 
For classified loans, on the other  hand, the 
dollar chargeoff  rates  were  just  under 10  per 
cent on substandard loans,  nearly 60 per  cent 
on doubtful loans, and  about 95 per cent  on 
loss  classifications.  When  compared  with  the 
previous section, these figures demonstrate that 
many  substandard  classifications  were  only 
partly  charged  off,  while  doubtful  and  loss 
classifications were  more  likely  to be charged 
off in their entirety. The percentages also imply 
that the average substandard loan was about 70 
times more likely to be charged off than an un- 
classified loan at the sample banks. In addition, 
doubtful  and  loss  classifications, respectively, 
l1 Total  unclassified loans  between 1962  and 1975  were 
computed  by  subtracting each  bank's  total  classifications 
above  the  cutoff  level  from  total  loans.  Likewise,  total 
chargeoffs from  unclassified loans  were  computed  as the 
difference  between total  chargeoffs  and  chargeoffs  from 
classified loans above the cutoff level. Thus, no individual 
unclassified  loan  was  separately  traced,  and  the  above 
chargeoff total for unclassified loans was simply compared 
with  total  unclassified  loans  over  the  same  period.  The 
reported chargeoff percentages should therefore be viewed 
as  approximations  which  are  probably  of  reasonable 
accuracy  given  the  large  volume  of  loans  included.  In 
addition,  one  of  the  larger  banks  was  dropped  in  this 
section because of unavailable loan information. 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City were 6 and 10 times more likely to be charged off  Deviations occurred largely among the small 
than the average substandard loan.  banks.  For  example,  three  of  the  four 
coefficients  of  variation  for  the  small  bank 
group were  over  50  per  cent,  while the large 
EVALUATION OF LOAN RISK 
If information from the examination process 
is  to  be  used  in  evaluating  the  riskiness or 
future loss exposure of  bank loan portfolios, a 
reliable  estimate  must  be  available  of  the 
relationship  between  examiner  classifications 
and  loan  losses.  As  shown  earlier,  the 
relationship between losses  and  classifications 
may be stated as follows: 
Thus, if  accurate estimates can  be made of 
the percentage of  substandard,  doubtful, loss, 
and  unclassified  loans that will  eventually  be 
charged off, then future loss exposure can  be 
closely  projected. On the other  hand, if  these 
percentages vary significantly in a manner that 
cannot  be  foreseen,  then  the  loan  loss 
estimates may give  a misleading signal of loss 
exposure. Therefore, this section evaluates the 
"stability"  of the classification-loss relationship 
and  discusses  factors  that  might  affect  its 
stability. 
The chargeoff percentages of  both classified 
and  unclassified  loans  did  vary  among 
individual banks and from  year  to year.  The 
variations  among  individual  banks  were 
examined with  the aid of  the individual bank 
data.  Each  bank's  chargeoff  percentages  by 
classification  category  were  collected, and  for 
each  category  an  unweighted  average,  a 
standard  deviation,  and  a  coefficient  of 
variation was  calculated  for the sample  bank 
group.  The  standard  deviation  indicates  the 
dispersion  of  individual  bank  chargeoff  per- 
centages around the mean, while the coefficient 
of variation relates this dispersion to the mean. 
These results are reported in Table 4. 
Table 3 
MNCQASSOFIED AND CLASSBFOED 
BQA&!S AND,  CHAWOEQFFS: 4862-75 
Total  Amount 
Loans  Charged Off  Per 
($millions)  .($ millions)  Cent  - 
All Banks 
Unclassified  *  1,827.2  2.5  0.14 
Classified :t  ..::  ,  , 
substandard  .  .  30.3  ,  "'  2.9  .  ' 9.61 
Doubtful  2.0  1.1  58.1 1 
Loss  :,  1.9  *  1.8  ,  .'94.75 
, .  ,  . 
Large Banks 
Unclassified*  1,401.6  1.7  0.1 2 
Classif i6d:t  .. '  .  . 
Substandard  19.2  1.6,  ' 8.28 
Doubtful  .  1.3  0.8  65.98 
Loss :  .  . 
>'*  , .  1  .O* :  .  0.9  ,  97.78 
'* % 
Small Banks 
Unclassjfied*  ~. 425.6  .  0.8  0.1 9 
..  .  , .  ,.  * 
~~assifikd:t  ,' 
Substandard  11.1  1.3  ,  11.90 
Doubtful  0.7  ~  0.3  ,  44.00 
LOSS:  '.  .'.  0.9  . 8':  0.8  ?.91.47 
*These  are  all  loans -during  the bears  1962-75 that 
were  not classified  at the sample banks.  The amount 
charged  off is  the difference between all chargeoffs, 
1962-75, 'and  the ,chargeoffs  $om  classififed  loans 
during this period.  .-  - 
?These  are  all  subkandard  classi'fications  above  the 
cutoff level,  1961-74, and all doubtful and'loss clas- 
sifications above the,cutoff level,  1962-75. The charge- 
off data were gene@ted by  tracing the subsequent per- 
formance of each cltssified loan:;, 
," 
-  - 
Economic Review  June 1979  23 bank coefficients of variation were all below 27 
per cent. This result  is  not surprising since  a 
few of  the small  banks had only a handful of 
classifications in each of  the categories over the 
sample period. 
Some  of  the  variation  in  chargeoff 
percentages  is  to  be  expected  even  if  the 
examiners classified loans on a consistent basis, 
since  a  sizeable  fraction  of  unclassified  loans 
was  not  reviewed  and since  bankers differ  in 
their efforts to collect on problem loans. Some 
variation  is also due in  part  to differences  in 
examiner  judgements  and  possible  diversity 
among  individual  loans  in  each  category, 
particularly  in  the  wider  categories  of  sub- 
standard and unclassified loans. 
Another factor that may cause variability in 
the  chargeoff  ratios  is  changing  economic 
Table 4 
PERCENTAGE OF CkASSlFlED 
AND UMCLASSBFOED LOANS 
CHARGED OFF: 4962-75 
Coeffi- 
Standard  cient of 
Mean  Deviation  Variation  - -- 
All Banks 
SB/S  10.19  7.75  .761 
DBID  49.25  27.73  .563 
LB/L  89.68  17.50  .I95 
UB/U  .I 6  .08  .500 
Large Banks 
SB/S  8.42  2.20  .261 
D  BID  64.28  17.08  .266 
LBIL  97.77  1.94  .020 
- UB/U  .I 3  .03  .231 
Small Banks 
SB/S  11.07  9.47  .a56 
DB/D  39.23  30.14  .768 
LB/L  86.65  19.95  .230 
UeIU  .I 7  .09  .529 
conditions.  Bank  loan  chargeoffs  as  a 
percentage of  total loans may be higher  when 
economic conditions are worsening than when 
they are improving. This  hypothesis  has been 
tested and confirmed  over a larger sample size 
by the authors.12 
Also, if  the economy is  worsening,  a  higher 
percentage  of  classified  loans  might  be 
expected  to  deteriorate  to  chargeoffs  than 
during a recovery period. This relationship was 
examined  by  computing  the  percentage, 
according  to  the  number  of  loans,  of  each 
year's substandard classifications at 'the sample 
banks that was subsequently charged off. Since 
most of these chargeoffs occurred  within three 
years  after  classification,  the  chargeoff 
percentages  were  codpared  to  the  economic 
conditions  that  prevailed  just  after  the 
classifications. 
These  yearly  chargeoff  ratios  exhibited  a 
definite  cyclical  trend.  Loans  classified  sub- 
standard in 1965, 1968, and 1973 had the high- 
est chargeoff rates. For these loans, the period 
after classification was characteristically a 
recession or growth recession. Additionally, the 
lowest  substandard  chargeoff  rates  were 
recorded for those classifications  near the end 
or  shortly  after  each  of  the above  recession 
periods. Such substandard classifications would 
thus be  facing  a  rapidly  improving  economy. 
Overall,  the chargeoff  rate for loans classified 
substandard at the sample banks just prior to a 
recession  period  averaged  about one  and 
one-half times the chargeoff rate of such loans 
during economic expansions. l3 
I* Hoenig and Spong, "Examiner Loan Classifications and 
Their Relationship to Bank Loan Chargeoffs and Economic 
Conditions," unpublished paper, pp. 18-20. 
13 In numerical terms, the lowest chargeoff rate was 14.75 
per cent for 1971 substandard classifications, and the high- 
est chargeoff rate was 35.19 per cent for 1968 substandard 
classifications.  During  the  three cycles  or  growth  cycles 
observed in this study,  the chargeoff percentages  for sub- 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic conditions and  trends,  then,  are 
important factors in  interpreting  examination 
data and  in  forecasting  future  loan  loss 
exposure.  As  mentioned  previously,  however, 
examiner judgement and other factors also may 
affect  the variability of  chargeoff  ratios. 
Consequently,  while  examination  data do 
provide useful information about loan portfolio 
risk, some variability exists in  the relationship 
between loans classified by  the examiners and 
future loan losses. 
The  actual  consequences  of  this  observed 
variability in the classification-loss relationship 
must be evaluated in the context of  the bank 
examination process. Since the main purpose of 
bank  examination  is  to  protect  bank 
depositors,  forecasts  of  future  loss  exposures 
are  important  to  bank  supervisors  only  as  a 
means  of  protecting  depositors.  Thus 
examiners are primarily concerned with finding 
an  efficient  means  to  detect  bank  problems 
before such problems threaten depositor safety. 
Variability in the classification-loss relationship 
becomes a severe  problem only  if  it disguises 
the condition of  problem banks. On balance, it 
would  seem  that the moderate degree of vari- 
ability in the chargeoff percentages in Table 4 
standard classifications occurring  immediately  prior  to a 
recession  ranged  from  6.22  to  13.33  percentage  points 
higher than the chargeoff rates for substandard classifica- 
tions  at or  near  the  beginning  of  the  previous  recovery 
period. 
is not sufficient to result in a bank with serious 
loan  problems  not  being  noticed  by  the 
examiners.  l4 
CONCLUSION 
A major portion of  the loan problems for the 
banks  studied  were  identified  in  bank 
examinations.  Examiners were  also successful 
in  categorizing bank  loans according to their 
relative risk of  default.  In addition, although 
loan classifications and chargeoffs showed some 
definite fluctuations  among  individual  banks 
and among the years of  the study, part of  this 
variation  could  be  explained  by  economic 
conditions. 
Consequently,  bank  examinations  provide 
useful information on loan risk, although some 
allowance  must  be  made  for  unexplained 
factors in predicting future loss exposure. And, 
because of  this  classification-loss relationship, 
loan classification data serve  as an  important 
factor in identifying problem banks which need 
closer supervision. 
l4  The value of loan classifications in  identifying  banking 
problems has also been recently tested with a larger sample 
of banks. See Sinkey, op. cit. Sinkey did not look at indivi- 
dual loan classifications, but instead tested the relationship 
between classifications and problem banks. He found that 
classified loans were a major factor in identifying problem 
banks and that while "most 'problem'  banks do not fail," 
"most failed banks are classified as 'problem'  banks prior 
to  their  closing." (See  p.  191.)  Similarly,  not  all 
classified  loans  are  charged  off,  especially  substandard 
classifications,  but  most  loan  chargeoffs  were  previously 
classified by the examiners. 
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